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MEDIMMUNE, MICROSOFT, AND KSR:  
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
IN 2007 TIPS THE BALANCE IN FAVOR OF 
INNOVATION IN PATENT CASES, AND 




“The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”1  Pursuant to this power, Congress enacted the first patent 
act in 1790.2  The Patent Act of 1952 now allows an inventor to obtain a 
patent for “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”3  
A U.S. patent grants the inventor the exclusive right to make, use, or 
sell the patented item,4 grants remedies for infringement including an 
injunction,5 damages which may be trebled,6 and attorneys’ fees.7  Thus, 
*  Professor of Legal Studies, Associate Dean for Executive and MBA Programs, Bowling 
Green State University; J.D., University of Toledo College of Law, Order of the Coif; M.A. 
and B.A., Bowling Green State University. 
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
2. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790).  The Act allowed one who invented or 
discovered any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement 
thereof, to petition to have letters patent issued.  See id. 
3. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
4. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
5. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006). 
6. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). 
7. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006). 
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a patent grants a valuable property right to the inventor, because during 
the patent term of twenty years from the filing date of the patent 
application,8 no one else may make, use or sell the patented invention.9
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive 
jurisdiction over patent appeals.10  In the last few terms, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has heard several patent-related cases, yet has not 
affirmed any of these.  In 2005, for example, the Supreme Court 
unanimously held in Merck KGaA v. Integra Life Sciences I, Ltd.,11 that 
under a Patent Act exemption from infringement,12 the use of patented 
compounds in preclinical studies is protected in certain situations, 
vacating the judgment of the Federal Circuit.13
In 2006, the Supreme Court held unanimously in eBay Inc. v. Merc 
Exchange, LLC14 that the traditional four-factor test used by courts of 
equity when awarding injunctive relief also applies to disputes under the 
Patent Act, vacating and remanding the decision of the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.15  Also in 2006, in a case that started as 
a patent case,16 the Supreme Court again unanimously held in Illinois 
Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc. that in a patent tying case the 
patent does not necessarily confer market power on the patentee.17  
Although the Supreme Court’s decision was concerning antitrust law, 
the Court vacated and remanded the judgment of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.18  Also in 2006, the Supreme Court 
dismissed a patent case, Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. 
Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.19
8. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006). 
9. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), (a)(4) (2006). 
11. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifescience I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 206 (2005).  See generally, 
Sue Mota, Merck v. Integra Life Sciences-The Supreme Court Protects the Use of Patented 
Compounds in Free Clinical Studies, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 54 (2006). 
12. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006). 
13. Merck, 545 U.S. at 208. 
14. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1841 (2006).  See generally, Sue 
Mota, eBay v. MercExchange–Traditional Four-Factor Test for Injunctive Relief Applies to 
Patent Cases According to the Supreme Court, 40 AKRON L. REV. 529 (2007). 
15. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1841. 
16. See Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Trident, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1159 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
17. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45-46 (2006).  See generally, Sue 
Ann Mota, The Untwining of Patent Law and Antitrust:  No Presumption of Market Power in 
Patent Tying Cases According to the Supreme Court in Illinois Tool Works v. Independent 
Ink, L 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 57, 58 (2006). 
18. Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 45-46. 
19. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs. Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006).  See 
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The Court in its 2006 term decided three patent cases and reversed 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in each.  This article will 
examine these three patent cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
2007.  First, the Court in January 2007 in MedImmune, Inc. v. 
Genentech, Inc. decided a patent licensee does not have to breach a 
license agreement before seeking declaratory judgment that the 
underlying patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed.20  The 
Federal Circuit’s judgment was reversed.21
On April 30, 2007, the Supreme Court decided both Microsoft Corp. 
v. AT&T Corp.22 and KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.23  In the 
former, Microsoft was held not to have supplied a component of an 
invention from the United States that had the possibility of infringing 
under the Patent Act.24  In the latter, which “could be one of the most 
significant business cases of the last decade,”25 the Court unanimously 
held that the Federal Circuit improperly applied a narrow and rigid 
approach to the requirement of non-obviousness under the Patent Act, 
and an expansive and flexible test must be used.26
This Article will examine these three patent cases from the Court 
and their implications.  These three decisions will shape the face of 
patent law for years to come.  The balance has been tipped by the Court 
away from the pro-patent perspective of the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, and towards a pro-innovation approach which is 
necessary in the fast-paced, high-technology global business 
environment. 
I.  MEDIMMUNE V. GENENTECH 
Genentech is the assignee and owner, with the City of Hope, of U.S. 
Patent number 4,816,567, the Cabilly I patent, named after its first 
inventor Shmuel Cabilly.  This application was filed in April 1983 and 
the patent was granted in March 1989 for an invention relating to the 
generally, Sue Ann Mota, What is Patentable Subject Matter?  The Supreme Court Dismissed 
Lab Corp. v. Metabolite Laboratories, but the Issue is not Going Away, 11 MARQ. INTELL. 
PROP. L. REV. 181 (2007). 
20. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 777 (2007).  See infra Part I. 
21. MedImmune, Inc., 127 S. Ct. at 777. 
22. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007).  See infra Part II. 
23. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).  See infra Part III. 
24. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1759-60. 
25. Michael Oreg, A Higher Hurdle for Investors:  Has it Become Too Easy to Win and 
Defend Patents? The Supreme Court Says Yes, BUSINESS WEEK, May 14, 2007, at 38. 
26. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1739. 
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field of immunoglobulin production, and to using recombinant 
techniques to produce immunoglobulins which are analogous to those 
found in vertebrate systems.27  Genentech also is the assignee of U.S. 
Patent number 6,331,415, the Cobilly II patent, filed in June 1988 and 
granted in December 2001, for a continuation of the Cobilly I patent for 
an invention relating to processes for producing immunoglobulins which 
can use one or more vectors.28
MedImmune had a license agreement since 1997 with Genentech 
under the Cabilly I patent.29 After the Cabilly II patent was issued in 
2001, Genentech advised MedImmune that one of its products, 
Synagis®,30 was covered by the Cabilly II patent and MedImmune owed 
royalties.  In response, MedImmune filed suit for declaratory judgment 
against Genentech.31  MedImmune’s claims of determination of 
27. Recombinant Immunoglobin Preparations, U.S. Patent No. 4,816,567 (filed April 8, 
1983) (issued March 28, 1989). 
28. Methods of Producing Immunoglobin Vectors and Transformed Host Cells, U.S. 
Patent No. 6,331,415 (filed June 10, 1988) (issued Dec. 18, 2001).  Celltech is the assignee and 
owner of U.S. Patent number 4,816,397 [hereinafter Boss Patent] for multi chain peptides or 
proteins and processes for their production.  MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 427 F. 3d 
958, 961 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Multichain Polypeptides or Proteins and Processes for their 
Production, U.S. Patent No. 4,816,397 (filed Nov. 14, 1984) (issued March 28, 1989).  In a U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) interference hearing which took seven and a half years, 
the PTO gave the Boss Patent priority.  MedImmune, 427 F.3d at 961.  Genentech filed suit, 
and a district court urged Genentech and Celltech to go to mediation.  Id.  The parties settled 
and agreed that the Genentech patent had priority and entered into cross-licensing 
agreements.  Id.  The district court directed the PTO to issue the Cabilly II patent.  
Genentech, Inc. v. Celltech Therapeutics, Ltd., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3489, No. 98-3926 
MMCCWDB, at *8 (N.D. Cal. March 16, 2001). 
29. MedImmune, 427 F.3d at 962.  MedImmune also was licensed with Celltech for the 
Boss Patent since 1998.  Id. 
30. Synagis® is indicated for the prevention of serious lower respiratory tract disease 
caused by a respiratory synytial virus in pediatric patients, such as premature babies and 
other children with medical conditions, at high risk.  RSV Prevention, 
http://www.synagis.com/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2007).  Over half a million babies have used 
Synagis since 1998.  Id.  Injectable Synagis® is MedImmune’s “flagship product.”  
MedImmune, Inc., HOOVER’S COMPANY RECORDS, In-depth Record, Hoover ID 10176 
(Jan. 9, 2007).   Synagis® is classified as a humanized monoclonal antibody, or an animal 
antibody modified into a predominantly human one.  Brief of Petitioner, MedImmune, Inc. v. 
Genentech, Inc., No. 05-608, 2006 C.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 423 at *3 (May 15, 2006).  
Synagis® was the first monoclonal antibody successfully developed to combat an infectious 
disease.  Id.  For more on Genentech and its patents, see generally, David M. Dudzinski, 
Reflections on Historical, Scientific, and Legal Issues Relevant to Designing Approval 
Pathways for Generic Versions of Recombinant Protein-Based Therapeutics and Monoclonal 
Antibodies, 60 FOOD DRUG L. J. 143, 161-67 (2005). 
31. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech Inc., No. CV03-2567 MRP, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
23443, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 3003).  The district court dismissed MedImmune’s antitrust 
and unfair competition claim on summary judgment.  Id. at *35-36. 
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contractual obligations, patent unenforceability, patent invalidity, and 
non-infringement of the patent were allowed to go forth against 
Genentech, and the patent claims could go forward against City of 
Hope.32
Genentech sought dismissal of all of these claims based on lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.33  The district court cited Article III of the 
Constitution, which authorizes the federal judiciary to hear cases and 
controversies.34  The Declaratory Judgment Act requires an actual 
controversy between the parties.35  Federal Circuit precedent was 
deemed by the district court to be controlling, and dictated that the case 
be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction36 because 
MedImmune was a licensee in good standing. 
MedImmune appealed, arguing that it met the requirements of the 
Declaratory Judgment Act, because if it stopped paying royalties, it 
could be sued.37  Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit held that the district 
court did not err.38  The dissent would have found no jurisdiction and 
would have transferred the case to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit.39
32. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., No. CV03-02567 MRP, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 28678, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2004).  Celltech was no longer a party.  Id.  The City 
of Hope is a California-based non-profit with a National Cancer Institute-designated 
Comprehensive Career Center.  City of Hope and Genentech work collaboratively on 
projects which have resulted in life-saving antibodies.  Initial Brief for Appellee-Respondent, 
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., No. 05-608, 2006 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 483, at *12 
(July 26, 2006). 
33. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., CV03-2567 MRP, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
28680, at *4 (C.D. Cal. April 26, 2004). 
34. Id. at *2 (citing U.S. CONST. art. III). 
35. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006), which states in pertinent part: 
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, . . . any court of the United 
States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other 
legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not 
further relief is or could be sought.  Any such declaration shall have the force and 
effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such. 
Id. 
36. MedImmune, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28680, at *9, *13.  The Federal Circuit had 
previously determined that “controversies over patent validity enforcement, and 
infringement would not be recognized while license agreements protected the licensee from 
suit.”  Id. at *5. 
37. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 427 F.3d 958, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  
MedImmune also argued that the settlement between Genentech was collusive and 
fraudulent.  Id. at 965. 
38. Id. at 969. 
39. Id. at 971 (Clevenger, J., dissenting).  The Ninth Circuit should determine whether 
the summary judgment was proper with the antitrust and unfair competition claims, according 
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The U.S. Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari40 
to decide whether Article III’s limitation on federal court jurisdiction to 
cases and controversies,41 as reflected in the Declaratory Judgment 
Act,42 requires a patent licensee to terminate or breach the license 
agreement before seeking a declaratory judgment that the patent is 
invalid, unforeseeable, or not infringed.43
Justice Scalia, in January 2007, writing for the majority, first 
observed that there was both a claim of patent invalidity and a contract 
claim.44
Turning to the jurisdiction issue, the majority stated that the “case of 
actual controversy” language under the Declaratory Judgment Act 
refers to cases or controversies under Article III of the Constitution.45  
The Supreme Court observed that there would be an actual controversy 
if the licensee ceased to make required royalty payments, but if the 
royalty payments were continued, as in this case, would there be a case 
or controversy?46
According to Supreme Court precedent, if the government, instead 
of a private party, threatened action, then a plaintiff would not have to 
expose himself to liability before bringing suit to challenge the 
governmental threat.47  Concerning action by a private party, the Court 
examined the only Supreme Court precedent on point, Altvater v. 
Freeman,48 which held that a licensee’s failure to stop paying royalties 
to the dissent.  Id.  For more on the Federal Circuit’s decision, see, Laurence P. Colton and 
Nigamnarayan Acharya, Intellectual Property, 57 MERCER L. REV. 1135, 1141-42 (2006); 
Charles C. Gholz, A Critique of Decent Opinions in Patent Interferences, 88 J. PAT & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y. 305, 338-39 (2006). 
40. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 546 U.S. 1169, 1169 (2006).  See Kali N. 
Murray, Rules for Radicals:  A Politics of Patent Law, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 63, 79 (2006). 
41. U.S. CONST. art. III. 
42. See supra note 35. 
43. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 767 (2007). 
44. Id. at 768-69.  The licensing agreement called for royalties whether or not the 
patent is valid.  Id. at 769. 
45. Id. at 771. 
46. Id. at 771-72. 
47. Id. at 772-73 (citing Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923)).  A farmer 
challenged the Washington State Alien Land Law, which was held not to violate the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 772.  Justice Scalia observed that the 
plaintiff did not have to “bet the farm” to bring action.  MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 772. 
48. Alvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359 (1943).  The issue of patent validity could be 
raised in a counterclaim in a suit for infringement involving a patent for a cutout machine for 
shoe uppers.  Id. at 360-63.  The Court stated that “[a] controversy was raging,” and the fact 
that royalties were paid did not make this a dispute of a hypothetical or abstract nature.  Id. 
at 364. 
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did not preclude a finding of a case or controversy if the payments were 
involuntary or coercive.  The respondent Genentech argued the 
common law rule that a party to a contract cannot both “challenge its 
validity and continue to reap its benefits.”49  The Court stated, however, 
that “it is hard to see how the common law rule has any application 
here.”50  According to the Supreme Court, if the respondents were 
correct that either the licensing agreement or the common law 
precluded suit, then the respondents would win on the merits, not that 
jurisdiction is defeated.51  The merits were left to the lower court on 
remand.52  Thus, a petitioner is not required to breach a license to seek 
declaratory judgment that a patent is invalid, unforeseeable, or non-
infringed.53  The judgment of the Federal Circuit was reversed and the 
case was remanded.54
The lone dissenter, Justice Thomas, believed that the case in 
question was not a case or controversy within Article III of the 
Constitution.55  MedImmune was a licensee in good standing, and thus it 
removed any threat of suit.56
MedImmune now allows a licensee in good standing to challenge the 
validity of the licensed patent.57  This tips the balance away from so-
called patent trolls, who purchase patents solely to enforce them against 
others, and allows a licensee to challenge the patent’s validity while 
ethically not breaching the license agreement, which is, at least 
occasionally, forced on the licensee.58  The merits of the agreement will 
be reached on remand. 
49. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 776.  MedImmune pointed out that the license contains 
no promise by MedImmune not to sue.  Id.  Further, Genentech disclaims any warranty of 
patent validity.  Reply Brief for Appellant-Petitioner, MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech Inc., 
No. 05-608, 2006 U.S. S. Ct. Brief LEXIS 739, at *24 (Aug. 30, 2006). 
50. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 777. 
51. Id. at 776.  Respondents also urged dismissal on a discretionary basis, that the 
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006), allows a court to declare rights.  Id. at 
776.  The Court observed, though, that a court is not required to do so.  Id.  The discretionary 




55. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 777 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
56. Id. at 780.  Justice Thomas also dissented on the issue of the contract claim, 
asserting that MedImmune did not raise and preserve one.  Id. at 779.  Further, according to 
Justice Thomas, Altvater was inapplicable.  Id. at 781. 
57. Id. at 777. 
58. One week after this decision, the Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of 
certiorari and also vacated and remanded MedImmune.  MedImmune, Inc. v. Centocor, Inc., 
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II.  MICROSOFT V. AT&T 
In a big win for Microsoft, the Supreme Court held on April 30, 
2007, in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., that Microsoft was not liable 
for infringing AT&T’s patent because Microsoft does not supply 
components of foreign-made competitors when it exports copies of 
Windows on master disks and encrypted software from the United 
States to be installed on foreign computers.59  This decision, along with 
its ramifications for the software industry, will be discussed in this 
section. 
AT&T owns patent number 32,580 (the ‘580 patent) relating to 
speech processing, and more particularly to digital speech coding 
arrangements.60  In June 2001, AT&T filed suit, alleging that Microsoft 
directly, contributorily, and willfully both infringed and induced others 
to infringe claims of this patent, by working, using, offering to sell, or 
selling certain Microsoft products.61  Microsoft ships “golden master” 
disks with the Windows Operating System on them to foreign original 
equipment manufactures (OEMs), and pursuant to a license, the OEMs 
from the master disk installs the operating system onto foreign-
assembled computers.  Similarly, Microsoft supplies the Windows 
Operating System code to foreign OEMs by sending an encrypted 
127 S. Ct. 1118 (2007).  The Federal Circuit in Centocor had similarly ruled that there was no 
case or controversy when the licensee of a patent was in compliance with the license 
agreement.  See generally, Sasha Mayergoyz et al., 2005 Patent Laws of the Federal Circuit, 55 
AM. U. L. REV. 1001, 1012-14 (2006). 
59. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746, 1751 (2007).  Microsoft is the 
world’s number one software manufacturer, and ranks forty-ninth on the Fortune 500 
ranking.  Microsoft Corp., Hoovers Company Records, In-Depth Records, Hoover ID 14120 
(May 1, 2007).  AT&T ranks twenty-seventh on the Fortune 500.  AT&T Inc., Hoovers 
Company Records, In-Depth Records, Hoover ID 11379 (May 1, 2007). 
60. Initial Brief-Appellee AT&T, Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., No. 05-1056, 2007 
U.S. S. Ct. Brief LEXIS 57, at *19 (Jan. 23, 2007).  The invention claimed in the ’580 patent 
was for digital speech compression, which transmits speech by converting it into digital code 
and decodes it at its destination.  This technology is recognized as a landmark.  The patent 
expired in 2001.  Id. 
61. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 01- Cir. 4872 (WHP), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
10716, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2003).  The district court granted Microsoft’s motion for 
partial summary judgment, limiting AT&T’s damages to those occurring on or after April 2, 
1999, when AT&T sent a letter to Microsoft to satisfy the actual notice requirement of the 
Patent Act.  AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F. Supp. 2d 409, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  
AT&T’s motion for partial summary judgment was granted on Microsoft’s affirmative 
defenses of implied license and equitable estoppel.  AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 01 Liu. 
4872, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1214, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2004).  AT&T’s motion for partial 
summary judgment on Microsoft’s affirmative defense and counter claim of inequitable 
conduct was also granted.  AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 01 Civ. 4872, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 1648, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2004). 
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electronic transmission of object code, which is decrypted and installed 
by the foreign OEMs.  According to AT&T, the golden master disks 
and the encrypted electronic transmissions infringe claims of AT&T’s 
‘580 patent.62
Microsoft moved for partial summary judgment, claiming that what 
it does is not an infringement.63  The Patent Act states that supplying 
from the United States all or a substantial portion of the components of 
a potential invention, where such components are uncombined in whole 
or in part to actively induce the combination of the components outside 
the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent, constitutes 
infringement.64  Microsoft thus moved, unsuccessfully, for summary 
judgment, contending both that the object code and software are not 
components, but rather intangible information, and that the copies are 
not supplied from the United States.65
Microsoft appealed, and in July 2005, the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit affirmed.66  The appeals court deemed the software to 
both be a component of a patented invention,67 and to be supplied from 
the United States.68  Judge Rader dissented on the extraterritorial 
expansion of United States patent law.69  The dissenter found nothing in 
the statute to attach liability for manufacturing activities occurring 
62. See supra note 60. 
63. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 01 Civ. 4872, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3340, at *4 
(March 5, 2004). 
64. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2006) states: 
(1)  Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the                                 
United States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention, 
where such components are uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner as to 
actively induce the combination of such components outside of the United States in 
a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the 
United States, shall be liable as an infringer. 
(2)  Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the 
United States any component of a patented invention that is especially made or 
especially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or commodity of 
commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, where such component is 
uncombined in whole or in part, knowing that such component is so made or 
adapted and intending that such component will be combined outside of the United 
States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred 
within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer. 
Id. 
65. Microsoft, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3340, at *6. 
66. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
67. Id. at 1369. 
68. Id. at 1370.  This was a question of first impression for the appeals court.  Id. at 
1369. 
69. Id. at 1373 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
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entirely abroad.70  According to the dissent, AT&T can protect itself by 
obtaining and enforcing foreign patents.71
Microsoft appealed, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted a writ of 
certiorari.72  The Court was asked to decide whether the software code 
was a patented invention under the Patent Act,73 and if so, is the 
transmission of that object code from the United States to a location 
outside the country a supply of the component?74  At oral argument, 
counsel for Microsoft argued that the master disk was not a component, 
and the information on the master disk was useless to the computer 
until it was made into a physical object which the computer could read.75  
Counsel for AT&T contended that the provision of the Patent Act was 
violated when the object code was supplied from the United States.76
The Supreme Court agreed with Microsoft that the export of master 
disks and encrypted software does not infringe AT&T’s U.S. patent.77  
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court and joined by Justices Scalia, 
Kennedy, and Souter, stated that there is no infringement when a 
patented product is made and sold in another country,78 but there is an 
exception providing for infringement when one supplies from the 
United States a patented invention’s components for combination 
abroad.79  Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that there are arguments on 
both sides of the issue of extending the Patent Act exception to the 
allegedly infringing conduct in this case.80  The Court discussed Deep 
South Packing Co. v. Laitrom Corp., which held that it was “not an 
70. Id. at 1375. 
71. Id. at 1376.  See generally, Christopher Rogers, Case Note, AT&T v. Microsoft:  Is 
This a Case of Deep South Déjà Vu?  59 ME. L. REV. 191 (2007); Nicholaus F. Rericha, Case 
Note, AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.:  Closing the Deep South Loophole (For Good This 
Time), 31 DAYTON L. REV. 551 (2006). 
72. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 467, 467 (2006). 
73. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746, 1753 (2007). 
74. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2006). 
75. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., No. 05-1056, 2007 U.S. Trans LEXIS 13, at *6, 
(Feb. 21, 2007).  The patent covers a program which has to be “married” to a computer.  Id. 
at *11.  The United States as amicus curiae agreed, stating that the copy or the hard drive is 
the component.  Id. at *19. 
76. Id. at *39.  Counsel acknowledged that the statute does not reach overseas 
activities.  Id. at *43.  Further, counsel could not think of any other machine than a computer 
that has a component that is not a physical thing.  Id. at *47. 
77. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1759-60.  The decision of the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit was reversed.  Id. 
78. Id. at 1781. 
79. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2006). 
80. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1751. 
  
2008] TIPPING THE BALANCE IN FAVOR OF INNOVATION  99 
 
 
infringement to make or use a patented product outside of the United 
States.” 81  After Deep South, Congress enacted the provision of the 
Patent Act which is in dispute in the instant case.82
First addressing the question of software as a “component,” the 
Court had to decide at what stage in a transaction software becomes a 
component.83  Because Congress included only combinable components 
in the patent statute,84 but not also “information,” “instructions,” or 
“tools” from which the components could be generated, the Court 
concluded that only a copy of Windows is a component.85
Concerning the second question of whether Microsoft supplied 
components from the United States, the Court concluded that a 
conventional reading of the statute requires a negative answer.86  The 
Court agreed with the dissent in the Federal Circuit,87 that “supplying” 
means a separate activity from a later copying or reproducing in a 
foreign locale.88
AT&T contends that this ruling leaves a loophole for software 
manufactures, who may quickly and cheaply send the master disk or 
code from the United States, instead of making installation copies in the 
United States.89  The Court stated that it is up to Congress to close the 
81. Deep South Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 527 (1972).  Deep South’s 
foreign purchases did not infringe as they assembled and used machines allegedly infringing 
on Laitrom’s patent claims outside the United States.  Id. at 526-27. 
82. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2006); Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1752. 
83. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1756.  “Component” is commonly defined as a “constituent 
part,” “element,” or “ingredient.”  Id. at 1755 n.11. 
84. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2006). 
85. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1756.  The Court did not decide whether software in the 
abstract or the intangibles could ever qualify as a component.  Id. at 1756 n.13. 
86. Id. at 1756. 
87. See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.  Microsoft issued a press release 
following the decision which stated in pertinent part: 
Today’s Supreme Court decision is important for the entire information technology 
industry, adding clarity and balance to our patent system.  This decision promotes a 
global patent system that works.  The ruling ensures that U.S. courts, like courts 
elsewhere, can respect the patent laws of other countries, helping promote 
cooperation among patent systems worldwide. 
Microsoft statement on U.S. Supreme Court decision in AT&T case, http://www.micro 
soft.com/Presspass/press/2007/apr07/04-30ATTPR.mspx (last visited Oct. 19, 2007). 
88. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1756-57.  The Court did not address Microsoft’s contention 
that a disk sent from the United States used to install software on a foreign computer would 
not give rise to liability for infringement if the disk were removed after infringement.  Id. at 
1757 n.14.  Justice Ginsburg did not reach this issue, id., but Justice Alito’s concurrence did 
not include note 14, id. at 1760 (Alito, J., concurring). 
89. Id. at 1759.  Microsoft argued that a contrary ruling, however, would either put 
software companies on a different playing field than other industries, or expand the 
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loophole if Congress deems such action appropriate.90  The statutory 
exception does not apply to design tools such as blueprints, schematics, 
templates, and prototypes, as the Court would not put the master disks 
and encrypted software which Microsoft exported into a separate 
category.91
Justice Alito concurred, joined by Justices Thomas and Breyer.92  
The concurrence reached the same conclusion, but by different 
reasoning.93  Agreeing that a “component” must be something physical, 
the concurrence reasoned that since no physical object supplied from 
the United States was combined with foreign computers, there is no 
infringement.94
Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that the holding of the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit is closer to the intent of Congress in 
enacting the provision in question.95  According to the dissent, software 
is a component.96  Thus, concerning patents on computer software, it is 
more important than ever that patent holders obtain and enforce 
foreign patents.  “Foreign law alone, not United States law, currently 
governs the manufacture and sale of components of patented inventions 
in foreign countries.”97
III.  KSR V. TELEFLEX 
In a decision issued by the Supreme Court on the same day as 
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.,98 the Court issued a unanimous 
landmark decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. and 
broadened the obviousness inquiry beyond what the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit had been applying.99  Where Microsoft dealt with 
jurisdiction of U.S. Patent Law.  Reply Brief for Appellant-Petitioner, Microsoft Corp. v. AT 
& T Corp., No. 05-1056, 2007, U.S. S. Ct. Brief LEXIS 95, at *25 (Feb. 14, 2007). 
90. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1759.  Congress realizes how easily software and other 
media can be transmitted and copied.  Id. at 1760. 
91. Id. at 1759. 
92. Id. at 1760 (Alito, J., concurring).  As with Justice Ginsburg, the concurrence 
excluded footnote 14.  See supra note 88.  Chief Justice Roberts took no part in the 
consideration or decision of this case. 
93. Id. at 1760. 
94. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1761.  Since the code on the master disk supplied from the 
U.S. is not a component, then not even a copy of the master disk is a component.  Id. at 1762. 
95. Id. at 1762 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
96. Id. at 1763 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
97. Id. at 1749. 
98. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
99. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1746 (2007). 
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newer technology of computer software and its export,100  KSR deals 
with the manufacturing technology of an automobile’s automatic gas 
pedal.101  However KSR’s ruling on the patent requirement of 
nonobviousness has implications for many industries in many sectors.102
The Patent Act of 1952 added the statutory requirement of 
nonobviousness,103 but this requirement for patentability goes back to 
the Supreme Court decision of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood in 1850.104  The 
Supreme Court articulated a test for determining nonobviousness in 
1966 in Graham v. John Deere.105  Forty-one years later,106 the U.S. 
Supreme Court decided another landmark case on nonobviousness, 
KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., wherein the Court reversed the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and provided an expansive 
flexible approach to obviousness, which promotes the progress of useful 
arts.107
Plaintiff Teleflex,108 through its subsidiary, Technology Holding 
100. See supra Part II. 
101. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1735-36. 
102. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006). 
103. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006), which states in part: 
(a)  A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed 
or described as set forth in section 102 of this title [35 U.S.C. § 102], if the 
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are 
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the 
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject 
matter pertains.  Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the 
invention was made. 
Id. 
104. See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 267 (1850). 
105. Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).  First the court must determine 
the scope and content of the prior art.  Id. at 17-18. Then the court must determine the 
differences between the prior art and the patent claim in question.  Id.  Then the court must 
determine the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.  Id.  Also, the court must evaluate 
evidence of secondary considerations.  Id.  The same day, the Court also decided Calmar, Inc. 
v. Cook Chem. Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966), and U.S. v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966). 
106. The Supreme Court decided three patent cases involving nonobviousness in 
between Graham and KSR.  Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 
57 (1969); Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976); Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 
(1976); S. Jafar Ali, You Suggest What?  How KSR Returned Bite to Nonobviousness, 16 FED. 
CIR. B. J. 247 at n.12 (2006-07). 
107. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1727.  This decision was proper, and should lead to an 
improvement in patent examination quality, according to one author.  Anard G. Patel, KSR 
v. Teleflex and Motivation to Combine, 80 J. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y. 1077, 1084 
(2006). 
108. Teleflex Inc. is a publicly traded company that has many product lines and 
operations which include the sale of marine, auto, and industrial products.  In 2005, it sold its 
automotive pedal systems to an affiliate of Sun Capitol Partners.  Teleflex Inc., Hoover 
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Corporation, holds patents used in the automotive industry, including 
an adjustable pedal assembly with electronic throttle control.  
Specifically, patent number 6,237,565 (the ’565 patent), called the 
Engeleau patent after its inventor, relates to a vehicle control pedal 
assembly having an adjustable mechanism which rotates and provides 
input to the electronic throttle control.109
Defendant KSR is a direct competitor of Teleflex, and also is a 
manufacturer and supplier of auto parts, including adjustable pedal 
systems.110  KSR was selected by General Motors to supply adjustable 
pedal assemblies for certain vehicles, and plaintiffs allege that these 
pedal systems infringe a claim of the ’565 patent.111  The defendant KSR 
answered, arguing both that there is no infringement and that the ’565 
patent is invalid under the Patent Act because it would have been 
obvious to someone with ordinary skill in the art of designing pedal 
assemblies.112
The district court applied the test of Graham v. John Deere113 for 
obviousness, and granted summary judgment for KSR.114  The district 
court concluded that a hypothetical person with an undergraduate 
degree in mechanical engineering or its equivalent in industry 
experience, with familiarity with pedal control systems, would have 
found the improvement in the only claim of the ‘565 patent at issue 
Company Records, In-Depth Records, Hoover ID 12375 (May 1, 2007). 
109. Adjustable Pedal Assembly with Electronic Throttle Control, U.S. Patent No. 
6,237,565 (filed Aug. 22, 2000) (issued May 29, 2001).  Claim is for a vehicle control pedal 
apparatus comprising:   
a support adapted to be mounted to a vehicle structure; an adjustable pedal 
assembly having a pedal arm moveable in force and aft directions with respect to 
said support; a pivot for pivotally supporting said adjustable pedal assembly with 
respect to said support and defining a pivot axis; and an electronic control attached 
to said support for controlling a vehicle system; said apparatus characterized by said 
electronic control being responsive to said pivot for providing a signal that 
corresponds to pedal arm position as said pedal arm pivots about said pivot axis 
between rest and applied positions wherein the position of said pivot remains 
constant while said pedal arm moves in fore and aft directions with respect to said 
pivot.   
Id. at [5]–[6]. 
110. Teleflex Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 298 F. Supp. 2d 581, 584 (E.D. Mich. 2003). 
111. Id. at 584-85.  Specifically, Teleflex claims that claim four is infringed.  Id. at 584.  
Two other patents were alleged to have their claims infringed, but the parties stipulated to 
the dismissal of these claims.  Id. at 585. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 587-96. 
114. Id. at 596. 
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obvious when compared to the prior art.115  Thus the district court found 
the claim in question invalid for obviousness, agreeing with KSR. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, 
holding that the district court did not apply the correct teaching-
suggestion-motivation test.116  Instead, according to the appeals court, 
the district court applied an incomplete teaching-suggestion-motivation 
test,117 and the district court should have made specific findings showing 
a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine prior art teachings in 
the particular manner claimed by the patent at issue. 
KSR appealed, arguing that the teaching-suggestion-motivation test 
applied by the Federal Circuit has no basis in either the text of the 
Patent Act or in 150 years of precedent of the Supreme Court.118  
According to KSR, the teaching-suggestion-motivation test is actually 
based on a rejection of the Supreme Court’s precedents.119  Teleflex, 
however, argued that the Court should not overturn the “flexible” 
standard for obviousness used by the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit for four decades, the settled suggestion-teaching-motivation 
inquiries.120
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit121 and remanded the case.  The Supreme Court began by 
rejecting the rigid approach used by the appeals court in applying the 
teaching-suggestion-motivation test.122  Instead, Supreme Court 
precedent including Hotchkiss v. Greenwood and Graham v. John Deere 
reflect a “functional” yet “broad” approach.123  Further, a patent for a 
combination which only unites old elements according to known 
methods is likely to be obvious.124  “[A] Court must ask whether the 
115. Id. 
116. Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 119 Fed. Appx. 282, 288 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
117. Id. at 290.  See generally, James Skelly, Legal Update, Teaching-Suggestion-
Motivation Under Review:  Developments in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 13 B.U. 
J. SCI. & TECH. L. 107 (2007); Michael Astorino, Obviously Troublesome:  How High Should 
the Standard be for Obtaining a Patent, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y. 239 (2007). 
118. Initial Brief of Appellant KSR, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., No. 04-1350, 2006 
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 702, at *24. 
119. Id. at *54. 
120. Id. at *9. 
121. KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1746 (2007). 
122. Id. at 1735. 
123. Id. at 1739. 
124. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Co., 340 U.S. 147, 152 (1950).  
This case predates the 1952 Patent Act and Graham v. John Deere, but the concept remains 
valid.  The cases decided with and after Graham also reflect this principle.  See KSR, 127 S. 
Ct. at 1731 (citing United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 40 (1966); Anderson’s-Black Rock, 
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improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements 
according to their established functions.”125
The Court acknowledged that following the principles for 
determining obviousness may be more difficult in other cases than in 
KSR.126  It is relatively easy to determine obviousness when one known 
element is substituted for another, or a known technique is applied to 
the prior art. In other cases involving interrelated teaching of multiple 
patents, however, the effects of demands known to the designers or 
present in the marketplace, and the background possessed by a person 
ordinarily skilled in the art may have to be ascertained.127  The helpful 
insight of the teaching-suggestion-motivation test should not have 
become a rigid mandatory formula.128
The Court concluded that “[w]e build and create by bringing to the 
tangible and palpable reality around us new works based on instinct, 
simple logic, ordinary inferences, extraordinary ideas, and sometimes 
even genius.  These advances, once part of our shared knowledge, 
define a new threshold from which innovation starts once more.”129  
Since KSR showed convincing evidence that the improvement to the gas 
pedal design was obvious to one of ordinary skill in the prior art, the 
appeals court was reversed and the case was remanded.130
CONCLUSION 
The United States Supreme Court decided three major patent cases 
in 2007, reversing the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in each.  
Independently, each case is important, and together, the Court has 
changed the face of patent law.  The first, MedImmune, Inc. v. 
Genentech, Inc.,131 reasonably allows a licensee in good standing to 
challenge the validity of the underlying patent.  In Microsoft Corp. v. 
AT&T Corp.,132 an important decision for the software industry, the 
Court held that it is not an infringement to supply from the United 
States a master disk or encrypted software, from which copies are made 
Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969); Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 
(1976)). 
125. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1731. 
126. Id. 
127. Id.  Courts should explicitly state this analysis.  Id. at 1731-32. 
128. Id. at 1731. 
129. Id. at 1746. 
130. Id. 
131. See supra Part I. 
132. See supra Part II. 
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overseas to be installed on foreign computers.  Finally, and perhaps the 
case with the broadest applications, the Court in KSR International Co. 
v. Teleflex Inc.,133 turned the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
from the rigid teaching-suggestion-motivation test to a more flexible test 
in line with the Court’s precedent for obviousness.  As a consequence of 
these cases, licensees do not have to break the license to contest the 
underlying patent.  In turn, the power of so-called “patent trolls” has 
been weakened, registering the patent in overseas patent offices 
becomes much more important, and innovation is encouraged as 
obvious improvements over the prior art will not be patentable. 
 
133. See supra Part III. 
